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A DECADE OF CONSIDERABLESIGNIFICANCE
Late-Ming Factional;sm in the Making, 1583-1593
BY

JIE ZHAO*
Universityof SouthernMaine

It hasbeen long heldthat,althoughthe Mingdynastycollapsedin
1644,the dynasticfatehadbeen sealedmuchearlier.The compilers
of Mingshihpronouncedthat "theMing dynastyactuallyfoundered
under[theWan-ligX emperor(r.1573-1620)].''l
They considered
lateWan-liperiod,to be one of theprincipalcontributors
to the Ming
decline.Someof themmaintainedthatthedynastyfellapartprimarily
due to factionalism,and factionalismbeganwith Shen.
Wan Yen g > (1637-1705),himselfa compilerof Mingshih,disagreedwiththisassessment.He acknowledged
ShenI-kuan'simpact
on thelastfewdecadesof factionalism,
buthe arguedthatShenShihhsingEpt(1535-1614) andWangHsi-chuchES(1534-1611)
had startedit.2Wan'sobservationpointedto a decade(1583-1593)
* I wouldliketo thankthe Departmentof EastAsianStudiesat PrincetonUniversityfor supportfrom its researchfund and accessto the Gest Libraryin the
summerof 2000, and the Harvard-Yenching
Institutefor providingaccessto its
libraryfacilities.I am greatlyindebtedto ProfessorCraigDietrichfor his advice
and editingin the courseof preparingthis paperfor publication.
1 Ming shih,ch. 21, p. 295. For completecitationssee the bibliography
at the
end of this article.
2 In Wan'sanalysis,
WangHsi-chuehwasthe shrewdest
of all,followedby Shen
Shih-hsing.ShenI-kuan,who cameafterthem,waslessastute,but muchmoreaggressivethanShenShih-hsing;
afterhe hadusedvicioustacticsto forceout hisrivals
his notorietysurpassed
thatof his twopredecessors.
WanYen'sviewis recordedin
Ch'uanTsu-wang'sChieh-ch'i
t'ing-chi,wai-pien,ch. 19, p. 919. Shen I-kuan'srivals
wereShenLi itX(1531-1615)andKuo Cheng-yuFiEX(1554-1612).Forhis hostilitytowardthesetwo men, see Ch'ienCh'ien-i,Mu-chaich'u-hsueh
chi, ch. 51, pp.
1289-1292.Incidentally,
whilesomescholarshavesuggestedthatlate-Mingfactionalismhad directrootsin the so-calledGreatRitualcontroversy
that tookplaceat
the beginningof the Chia-chingreign(1522-1566),this remainsa subjectof debate. ThereforeI wouldlike in this essayto step asidefrom this viewpointand

(C)Brill,Leiden, 2002
Also availableonline- www.brill.nl
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that marked a political juncture in the late Ming. This period deserves
closer attention. It witnessed the end of Chang Chii-cheng's q2K
)r

E authoritarian
but effectiveadministrationand the beginningof
increasing
discordwhicheventually
paralyzedthe centralgovernment.
The seniorgrandsecretariesShen Shih-hsingandWangHsi-chuieh
contributed
to thisdiscord,asWansaid.Butthe evidence
undoubtedly
shows that the reality was much more complex, with two other
elements,theWan-liemperorandthe opposition,helpingto inflame
factionalism.
Underwhatcircumstances,
then, did the situationbeginto shift?
overwhelmed
Whydidthingschangeto sucha degreethatfactionalism
the government?To addressthese questionswe mustfirstconsider
two powerfulmen, T'ai-tsuj*4tf (r.1368-1398),the founderof the
Mingdynasty(1368-1644),andSeniorGrandSecretaryChangChuiwhobothcastenormousshadowsoverthepolitical
cheng(1525-1582),
developmentsof this decade.

Living with Tai-tsu's Legacy
The institutionaldisintegration
was the unintendedconsequence
of the visionof T'ai-tsu,the manwho set the despotictoneforMing
governance.As is well known,the dynasticfounderwas determined
to keep the bureaucracysubordinateto the throne and abolished
theprimeministership.3
Astheburdentherebyforceduponthethrone
was too much for later emperors,the GrandSecretariatgradually
assumedmany of these responsibilities.Lackingformalexecutive
powers,the seniorgrand secretariesfaced the perpetualdilemma
of, in thewordsof CharlesHucker,"howto becomea primeminister
undera systemthat did not permita primeministership."4
Anotherfeatureof T'ai-tsu'sinstitutionscamefromhis realization
thathis descendants'
misrulemightjeopardizethe dynasty.He establisheda setof strictrulesandmechanismsto preventthe thronefrom
focus on the political struggles during the decade 1583-1593, which I believe set
the stage for the chronic, destructive factionalism that eventually crippled the Ming
dynasty.
3 This was in 1380. See Ming shili, ch. 72, p. 1733.
4 Charles 0. Hucker, "The Tung-lin Movement of the Late Ming period,"
p. 139. In light of Hucker's remark, the term "administration" as used in this article
refers to the senior grand secretary's office and senior ministers and censors. Although
administrations technically "headless", like the grand secretariat, did not exercise
formal executive power, they nevertheless controlled the decision-making process
and submitted their recommendations to the emperor for final approval.
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disrupting governmental operations. For instance, the emperor was
not expected to initiate policy, and supervising secretaries of the Six
Offices of Scrutiny, part of the censorial-supervisory branch of the
government, were empowered to veto imperial decisions.5 As Charles Hucker explains, "Although the civil-service establishment was
legally restricted to advisory rather than legislative powers, the normal administrative routine gave it some significant procedural checks
on imperial irresponsibility or arbitrariness. The right to make final
decisions was always the emperor's, but the civil servants normally
prescribed the alternatives among which the emperor could choose."6
Against this background, Chang Chiu-cheng was probably the only
senior grand secretary in the Ming who acted somewhat like a prime
minister. He was able to run the government in a heavy-handed fashion
mainly because the Wan-li emperor was still a boy, and his mother,
the Empress Dowager, allowed Chang to discipline her son strictly.7
The deep resentment the emperor vented after Chang's death as a
consequence reaffirmed the despotic intimidating power of the throne.8
The passing of Chang Chiu-cheng in 1582 unsettled the government.
His opponents, who had been suppressed by his administration,
clamored for redress of their grievances. The Wan-li emperor, who
was now an adult, exploited anti-Chang resentment to condemn his
stern former tutor's leadership style, purge his clique, and confiscate
his family property.9 Chang's policies were abandoned by grand
secretaries who were eager to disassociate themselves from their
5 Ming shih,ch. 74, pp. 1805-1806. Also see Charles 0. Hucker, T-heCensorialSystem
of Ming China, pp. 100- 102.
6 Hucker, The CensorialSystemof Ming China, p. 42.
7 Yu Shen-hsing, Ku-shanpi-chu, ch. 2, p. 16; p. 19. Wen Ping, Ting-ling chu-luie,
ch. 1, pp. 18-19.
8 YU Shen-hsing, ch. 2, pp. 19-20; ch. 4, p. 42.
9 Chang Chu-cheng's authoritarian presence at court and intolerance of criticism reached a peak in 1577 when Chao Yung-hsien Xi )(1535-1596), Wu Chunghsing %tIj(1540-ca.
1598), Shen Ssu-hsiao it: J
(1542-1611), Ai Mu XfZ (cj.
1558), and Tsou Yuan-piao N T (1551-1624) criticized him for not observing the
mourning of his deceased father. Their memorials infuriated the senior grand secretary; they were, as a result, flogged and cashiered. See Wen Ping, ch. 1, pp. 38-44,
and Hucker, "The Tung-lin movement of the late Ming period," pp. 139-140.
This harsh suppression of his critics generated more anti-Chang resentment. Shortly
after Chang's death, his opponents condemned the previous administration with
a vengeance. With imperial connivance the purge went overboard, causing the
suicide of Chang's eldest son. See Hsu Hsiieh-mo, Kui-yu-yuankao, ch. 19, 126/12.
Wu Yuian-ts'ui, Lin-chil man-lu, ch. 6, pp. 312-313. Wen Ping, ch. 1, pp. 68-69.
T'an Ch'ien, Kuo-ch'iieh,ch. 72, p. 4479.
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predecessor'". Few could then foresee that this reaction would have
serious repercussions.
The Wan-li emperor, Chang Chu-cheng's opponents, and the Grand
Secretariat all maneuvered to align the administrative offices to their
own advantage. Both the emperor and Chang's opponents feared
that the power of the Grand Secretariat might easily slip into the
hands of a senior grand secretary again. To prevent this, they teamed
up to weaken that office. Their concerted denunciation of the deceased
grand secretary sent a chilling message to his successors, and effectively
ended the practice by which a powerful senior grand secretary dominated the central government. "IThe Grand Secretariat's authority,
as a result, was significantly reduced in favor of the emperor: no grand
secretaries after 1582 ever risked standing up to him.'2 But the emperor's victory did not bode well for the long-term health of the dynasty.
The Grand Secretariat, beginning with Senior Grand Secretary
Shen Shih-hsing, found itself on the defensive. It was difficult to operate
in such hostile political climate, when anti-Chang resentment and
the emperor's suspicion of the Grand Secretariat were at a peak.
However, soon the emperor and the opposition started to clash on
policy and administrative issues, and their strained relationship provided opportunities for Shen to moderate the emperor's hostility.'3
Shen Shih-hsing had to balance effectiveness against survival. Effective administration required a strong leadership, which would surely
provoke the emperor. Mediation between the emperor and his colleagues, always placating the throne, would foster his own survival.
Not a risk-taker,he played the role of mellow housekeeper. He indulged
the emperor and swayed him to his side, gaining the leverage necessary
to deal with the opposition. The consequences of his choice were by
no means trivial. The mechanisms the Grand Secretariat had once
used to manage the emperor were now brushed aside.'4 This was
10 T'an Ch'ien, ch. 72,
p. 4441, 4448. The grand secretaries T'an referred to
were Chang Ssu-wei PiV
ElT` (1526-1585) and Shen Shih-hsing. Also see Ch'ien Ch'ieni, ch. 30, p. 895.
1 Hsieh Kuo-chen, Ming-Ch'ing chih-chi tang-sheyun-tungk'ao, pp. 12-14.
12Mingshih, ch. 218, p. 5768.
13 As the focus of attention at court shifted from the purge to the issue of balancing power among many other administrative concerns, a growing number of junior
officials found themselves in the opposition challenging the emperor and the Grand
Secretariat. The term "Chang's opponents" no longer adequately applies to this pressure
group. From this point onwards, therefore, I shall use the word "opposition" instead.
1'4WIVan-li
shu-ch'ao,Ts'ai Shih-ting's memorial, 58/259. T'an Ch'ien, ch. 83, p.
5155.
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just one of the institutional practices that eroded quickly during Shen's
tenure as senior grand secretary (1583-1591).
Under T'ai-tsu's shadow, the management of state affairs had been
balanced uneasily between the throne and the Grand Secretariat,
and between the Grand Secretariat and the ministries. The decade
1583-1593 saw this balance undone as Chang Chu-cheng's legacy
and T'ai-tsu's institutions bedeviled the relationship between the Wanli emperor, the Grand Secretariat, and the opposition. Tension grew
between the emperor and the opposition, each offering conflicting
interpretations of T'ai-tsu's rules regarding imperial power and its
limitations. Meanwhile, the opposition called for the Grand Secretariat
to relinquish control over the six ministries, using T'ai-tsu's intent
as their justification. Thus, the emperor bent the Grand Secretariat
to its knee and the opposition tried to free the six ministries from the
Secretariat's interference. Pressured from both sides, Shen Shih-hsing
used their conflicting interests of the emperor and the opposition to
further his ends. The entanglement of this triad gradually undermined
the government, taking it to uncharted territory, with ominous implications for the future.
Obstreperous

Emperor

The Wan-li emperor, after 1582, "rapidly degenerated into a selfindulgent and irresponsible despot."'5 The remaining thirty-eight years
of his reign witnessed the full exhibition of his unbridled character:
aloofness from government affairs, volatile temper, and extravagance.'6
His isolation deepened his suspicion and distrust of officials, creating
a vicious cycle in which he raged against outspoken critics, cut off
communications with the government, and unleashed eunuchs as his
special agents in the ruthless pursuit of wealth, thereby generating
still more criticism. 7 One scholar-official lamented that the emperor's
15

Hucker, The CensorialSystemof Ming China, p. 153.
a memorial from 1600, Wang Te-wan voiced his concerns about the WanIi emperor's huge expenditures, which caused fiscal tightness and a drastic reduction
of the defense budget. See Wan-li shu-ch'ao, 59/282-285.
17 L. C. Goodrich and Fang Chaoying, eds., Dictionagyof Ming Biography,account
of the Wan-li emperor by Charles Hucker, pp. 324-337. Ray Huang, "Fiscal Administration during the Ming dynasty," p. 113. Also see Frederic E. Wakeman, Jr., The
GreatEnterprise,p. 11. It should be pointed out that Ray Huang presents a more sympp. 1-41,
pathetic picture of the Wan-li emperor in his 1587, A rearofNAoSignzficance,
93-95.
161n
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desire ran rampant at the cost of his people's flesh and blood, leaving
them impoverished and putting the state in great peril.18
All of these problems began to surface as early as in 1585. One of
the alarming indicators was the emperor's withdrawal from his imperial
duties. Study sessions, ceremonies, memorials, and daily audiences
with officials bored him. Drink, sex, and extravagance gave him
excitement and pleasure. He remained aloof from government affairs,
while insisting on his right to ultimate power.
We should not underestimate the importance of imperial study
sessions, ceremonies, reviewing of memorials, and daily audiences.
Woven together as a web of restraints, they worked to mold an
emperor's public persona as a responsible ruler and a man of dignity
and compassion. These rituals exalted the emperor, but they also
restrained him, trimming his rough edges and taming his tyrannical
impulse as far as was possible. Above all, they pressured him to
maintain a modicum of civility and self-restraint toward his subjects,
especially those around him. The frightening consequences of an
emperor's non-compliance were a sufficient impetus for officials to
urge him to play his assigned roles. Understandably, then, several
heated controversies at the late-Ming court focused on imperial
deportment and decorum.
In a small, isolated world where humble eunuchs and submissive
grand secretaries kowtowed to him, the Wan-li emperor defied political
and ethical constraints. He did not encounter much resistance from
his senior grand secretary: Shen Shih-hsing carefully calculated how
much risk would be involved if he upset the emperor. The condemnation of Chang Chti-cheng served as a reminder.
The year 1586 saw the emperor's behavior obstruct the operation
of the government and his resentment toward criticism harden, when
the issue of choosing an heir apparent (the so-called Kuo-pen[ 74S
controversy, which I shall discuss later) began to heat up. Since Shen
Shih-hsing was reluctant to speak frankly to the emperor and other
senior officials followed suit, junior officials took on the task of
confronting him. The "avenues of criticism" (yen-lu
i ), an institutional mechanism dating from the beginning of the dynasty,
permitted them to admonish the emperor and senior officials. 19Wanli's cancellation of study sessions, official audiences, and ceremonial

Ting Yuian-chien, Tsun-cho-t'angwen-chi,ch. 1, 170/654-656.
Ta-Ming hli-tzien,ch. 209, pp. 481-489. Also see Ono Kazuko, Minki to'shako,
pp. 166-173.
18
19
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proceedings late that year prompted Lu Hung-ch'un X 4 , a
secretary of Rites, to submit a critical memorial.
In his edict, the Wan-li emperor had adduced health problems to
justify the cancellation. Lu's memorial cited information leaked to
the public that the emperor had fallen off a horse and bruised his
forehead, pointing out the contradictions. Whether it was a horseriding accident or dizziness and fatigue,20 he reminded the emperor
of the consequences of his behavior, using a traditional technique to
warn the emperor that his misconduct would tarnish his image in
history: "Your Majesty is observed by the public today, and will be
judged by future generations... Even if all the officials, intimidated
by Your Majesty, dared not point out your misbehavior, it would be
impossible to prohibit such (unfavorable) information from being
recorded in unofficial histories passing on to later generations." He
then advised the emperor, "If Your Majesty is really sick, you should
restrain yourself from pleasure-seeking for the sake of the state. If
you are not sick, you should maintain truthfulness in your imperial
edict rather than use an excuse leading to the spread of rumors."'21
Lu's memorial enraged the emperor. He was flogged and then
cashiered.22

By contrast, Shen Shih-hsing carefully phrased his words to the
emperor at the end of 1587: "Your Majesty only attended a lecture
once this year. Please pay attention to the study of classics and history
next spring."23 The emperor cordially thanked his senior grand
secretary, but the following year he failed to attend a single session.
Shen submitted the written lectures out of obligation, quietly accepting
the emperor's absence.24
The emperor figured that he could force the officials to keep quiet
about his behavior. In principle, the senior grand secretary should
counsel him. But Shen Shih-hsing acted as a yes-man; thus it was
junior officials that the emperor had to deal with. Wan-li thought
that severe consequences, corporal punishment in particular, would
silence them.25 Much to his dismay, intimidation did not work on
Lu Hung-ch'un, and there was no shortage of courageous junior
20 Lu Hung-ch'unbelieved that the emperor'sindulgencein sexualpleasureprobably caused fatigue and dizziness.
21

Wan-li ti-ch'ao, pp. 335-339.

Ibid., pp. 339-340.
23 T'an Ch'ien, ch. 74, p. 4569.
24 Ibid., ch. 74, p. 4583. Also see Ming shih,biography of Shen Shih-hsing, ch.
218, p. 5749.
25 Wang Chia-p'ing, WangWen-tuan
kungch'ih-tu,ch. 7, 149/70 1.
22
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officials who stubbornly and persistently raised the issues. This agitated
him immensely.
Dogged

Opposition

By 1589, the Wan-li emperor's relationship with his officials had
further deteriorated. Tensions rose over the issue of naming an heir
apparent. Furthermore, his lavish expenditures contributed to serious
fiscal tightness, his rare contacts with the administration undermined
governmental operations, and the flogging of palace eunuchs and
maids became a frequent and disturbing occurrence.26 The unrestrained emperor, a volatile man only in his twenties, disrupted the
government and committed arbitrary violence to vent his blind rage.
It was indeed a fearsome thing to reprimand him. But Lo Yu-jen Y
{ ff (cs. 1583), a commentator in the Grand Court of Revision, came
forward to do just that.
In his memorial of 1589, Lo rhetorically assumed the role of a doctor
diagnosing the sickness and offering a four-point prescription to his
patient. He began,
I believe that if a man pursues a government career he ought to speak to the
emperor with all sincerity. I have been in the capital for more than a year
now and have only met Your Majesty three times at court. It is said that you
suffer from an overabundance of fire element inside the body, and fatigue.
Your Majesty cannot even preside over the state ceremonies such as paying
homage to Heaven and the imperial ancestors, and has to send officials to
represent you. For quite a long time Your Majesty has engaged in state affairs
only rarely, has abandoned the study of classics, and has stopped attending
lectures. Based on all this, I conclude that the sickness of Your Majesty is
impossible to cure through normal medical treatment. I am confident that
my four-point prescription can heal you. The condition comprises heavy
drinking, sexual pleasure, greed, and volatile temperament. Heavy drinking
hurts your stomach, concupiscence consumes your energy, greed weakens your
mental concentration, and hot temper harms your liver.
Surrounded with delicious delicacies, Your Majesty should restrain yourself
from drinking too much. To the contrary, you imbibe during the day, not
satisfied, then continue drinking long into the night. Highly intoxicated, Your
Majesty is running around unsteadily brandishing knife and sword. It is heavy
drinking that causes you to stumble.
Surrounded by consorts and concubines, Your Majesty should restrain
yourself from too much sex. To the contrary... you have become attracted to
Consort Cheng and promote her rank lavishly... you spoil her to the point
of doing whatever she says. As a result, the decision to name the imperial
26

Ibid., ch. 7, 149/686.
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heir is postponed again and again. It is sex that makes you indecisive [on
the issue of the heir apparent].
With the whole empire under your command, Your Majesty should uphold
the virtue of frugality. To the contrary, you repeatedly demand [from the
government] as much as several hundred thousand taels of silver, and as much
as several thousand yards of silk. You show no sense of frugality. Furthermore,
you press your eunuchs to hand in quantities of silver. If they do you are
delighted; if they don't you are angry and flog them... Clearly, there is a
problem of greed.27
Your Majesty beats palace maids and eunuchs daily. If they are indeed guilty
of misconduct, the law will hold them accountable. Depending on their wrongdoing, they should be reproached or dismissed. There is no need to resort to
corporal punishment to the point of beating them to death. These people live
close to Your Majesty. If beating to death doesn't fit their offense, severe punishments are likely to trigger incidents. More seriously, Your Majesty harbors
resentment and anger towards outspoken officials... They are demoted,
dismissed or exiled. This is due to your volatile temperament.

Lo appealed to Wan-li to resume his imperial duties:
Your Majesty loves drinking. How can you prohibit officials from attending
drinking parties? Your Majesty loves sex. How can you stop officials from
excessive indulgence in sexual pleasures? Your Majesty is greedy. How can
you hold officials accountable for their avarice? And Your Majesty is hottempered. How can you persuade officials to remain on good terms with each
other? This disease, manifested in drinking, sex, greed and outbursts, disturbs
your mind and weakens your body. It is no wonder that you are not well.
Your Majesty is now in your prime, but you don't attend state affairs at court.
Once you pass this age, what will you then do about your duties?

And he concluded,
What I present here is neither pleasant to your ear nor welcome to your
heart. But it is the right diagnosis for your sickness. If you accept my advice,
you will attend state affairs, be close to honest officials, and keep a distance
from consorts and concubines. Stay away from the four problems, compose
yourself and meditate. Within half a year, you will become vigorous and healthy
again.25

Lo Yii-jen's memorial was a bitter pill for the emperor to swallow.
During an audience with Shen Shih-hsing he complained: "I am
criticized for keeping memorials and not sending them back to the
administration, as those ridiculous memorials claim. The truth of the
matter is, I am very sick, incapable of reading the memorials under
27 Wen Ping, ch. 4, pp. 229-303, provides a detailed overview of the eunuch
commissioners' brutal abuse of power and unbridled pursuit of wealth, which
according to him inflicted immense damage on society and common people. Chao
Yung-hsien, Sung-shih-chaichi, ch. 28, 41/442-444. Also see Ray Huang, Taxation
and Governmental
Finance in 1 6th-CentuyMing China, pp. 7-8.
28 Lo's memorial is included in Wan-li ti-ch'ao, pp. 469-474.
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the dim light. This causes occasional slowdowns. Meanwhile, these
officials, one after another, express their crazy opinions continually.
I have yet to finish reading one memorial: a second has already arrived.
They keep attacking each other in their memorials to the point of
paying no respect to the court etiquette."29He dismissed Lo's memorial
as nonsense, but did not go so far as to call it slanderous, no doubt
for fear of triggering an investigation.
Lo Yui-jen's courage unsettled Shen Shih-hsing. Flogging Lo, which
the emperor contemplated, would only draw public attention to the
vindictive monarch and his compliant administration. It was better
to hush it up. Shen, therefore, advised the emperor to sequester Lo's
memorial and dismiss him on the charge of insubordination.30
In the opposition's eyes these actions breached the ground rules
of politics. Shen Shih-hsing knew very well the procedure that required
memorials, after the emperor's review, to be returned to the Six Offices
of Scrutiny. The Six Offices of Scrutiny were to make copies of
memorials and imperial edicts and then send them to the appropriate
ministries. Also, the memorials should be included in the official
gazetteers to document the political life of the emperor and the administration.31 This procedure had at least two functions: to keep
the communication between the throne and its officials transparent,
and to keep them in check. Sequestering critical memorials, known
as "liu-chung"I 4i, aimed to purge objectionable materials from the
official record. The emperor henceforth did this repeatedly. He
"pigeonholed memorials in the palace and refused to make decisions
even on appointments, so that large numbers of offices fell permanently
vacant and much governmental business could not be carried out at

all."132
Not surprisingly, the "avenues of criticism" became a battleground.
The opposition fought to broaden them, defending its right to scrutinize
the emperor and the Grand Secretariat. The other side attempted
to constrict them, for which purpose the accusation "insubordination" (ch'u-wvei l)
was another handy device. Junior officials who
29

Ibid., p. 483.

Ibid., p. 483. Also see IlVan-lishu-ch'ao, Ch'ien I-pen's memorial, 58/244. In
reviewing Lo's case, the Sltingshili compilers agreed witlh the late-M/ing critics that
Sheni's advice, i.e., sequestering memorials, provided the emperor the means to cut
off communicationis with the officials. Ming shih, biography of Shen Shih-hsing, ch.
218, p. 5749.
cli. 213, p. 526. MVingshi/l, ch. 74, pp. 1805-1806.
T-1
Ta-Ainlg hlei-tdeni,
`
Hucker, The CensorialSystemof lVlingClzina,p. 43.
30
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asserted their institutional right to speak out were charged with this
infraction. They saw this as censoring their tongues and blocking
the "avenues of criticism."33
Shen Shih-hsing's subservience won the emperor to his side. The
two realized that they had more in common than not, and both found
the opposition irritating. Thus they often teamed up to suppress the
other side. Yet far from cowing the opposition, sequestering memorials
and preferring charges of insubordination only stoked its outrage
against what it saw a gross violation of principles, and often triggered
confrontation.
The two sides had collided over a dispute between senior officials
in the Nanking administration in 1586. In that year, Fang Huan PaV, Education-intendant Censor at Nanking, submitted a memorial
l5 (1513-1587) of incompeaccusing Left Censor-in-chief HaiJui
tence, rigidity, and hypocrisy. Fang was believed to have initiated
this preemptive assault as a defense against Hai Rui's report to the
central government about his corrupt behavior.34 A man of notorious
dishonesty and cruelty, he smeared Hai whose integrity and character
were legendary among officials and common people alike.35 Three
freshmen chin-shihin Nanking, outraged by Fang's shameless attack,
submitted a memorial to the central government demanding his impeachment.36 Rather than conduct a fair inquiry, the administration
sheltered Fang and discharged the three young men for "insubordination."37 Shortly afterwards, the Censorate issued a new regulation
requiring the directors of all departments in both capitals to tighten
These actions sent
their supervision over newly appointed chin-shih/.38
33 Wan-li shu-ch'ao,Shih Meng-lin's memorial, 58/352-353.

34Ibid., Hsii Ch'ang-chi's memorial, 59/99-100. Fang Huan was affiliated with
the circle of the senior grand secretary. Hsu Fu-tso, a native of Su-chou, made a
harsh indictment of Fang Huan's conduct. He cited a pamphlet, written and circulated by Su-chou students, which exposed Fang's abuse of power, brutality, and
corruption. See his Hua-tang-ko ts'ung-t'an,ch. 3, pp. 10a-12b.
35 Ho Ch'iao-yuian, Ming-shan ts'ang, 427/273-279.
Wu Yuan-ts'ui, ch. 7, pp.
327-329. Hsia Hsieh, Ming t'ung-chien,ch. 68, pp. 2679-2680. Also see Goodrich
and Fang, Dictionagyof Ming Biography,account of Hai Jui by Chaoying Fang, pp.
474-479.
(1554-1607), Ku
36 One of these three memorialists was Ku Yuin-ch'eng R R
Hsien-ch'eng's R Aj; (1550-1612) younger brother. Considering the elder brother
an active member of the opposition, the administration suspected that it had orchestrated this move and therefore deemed the memorial nothing but another partisan
attack. This memorial is included in Wan-li shu-ch'ao, 59/94-99.
37 WU Yuan-ts'ui, ch. 8, p. 368.
38 Wan-li ti-ch'ao, p. 326. Also see T'an Ch'ien, ch. 73, p. 4538.

This content downloaded from 130.111.46.40 on Fri, 3 May 2013 15:37:28 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

A DECADE

OF CONSIDERABLE

SIGNIFICANCE

123

a message to all junior officials that the administration would not
tolerate their frank expression of views.
This case infuriated the opposition. Shen Ssu-hsiao it , i (15421611), a well-known opposition figure, submitted a memorial citing
the Ming Statutesand the Ming Code,which clearly stated that officials
and commoners were both entitled to express their views about state
affairs. He argued, "The fact that officials of the censorial agencies
are obligated to speak by no means suggests that officials from other
branches, as well as commoners, should be prohibited from speaking...
As long as the issues concern the welfare of the people and the state,
not only the censors but also other officials, not only senior but also
junior officials, have the right to speak out." Shen criticized the new
regulation, saying, "Directors should discipline the freshmen for
cultivating personal access to the powerful; instead they discipline
them for speaking the truth. They should teach them to be honest
and loyal officials; instead they instruct them to bite their tongues
and shut their mouths." The result, he said, was that the censors and
senior officials did not speak out for fear of jeopardizing their own
careers; non-censorial and junior officials, who were not afraid, were
not allowed to speak out. Shen wondered whether the sanctions would
serve the interest of the state at all.39
Grand Secretary Wang Hsi-chuieh, a trusted friend and colleague
to Shen Shih-hsing ever since he joined the Grand Secretariat in 1584,
defended the policy on grounds of protecting the senior officials' dignity
and the court etiquette.40 He insisted: "This is the court; it is not like
a village where an old man tolerates anyone yelling, quarreling and
fighting in front of him. If the state indulged this kind of behavior, it
would harm the state. As for the new regulations, the Censorate made
them. This has nothing to do with us (Shen Shih-hsing and Wang).
Besides, it is wrong to remain indifferent to improper conduct without
reprimand. Yet no sooner is the reprimand issued than we are accused
of intolerance."'41
The central government was likened by one scholar-official to a
quarrelsome law court with endless scandal, dispute, protest, and
retaliation.42 The Grand Secretariat and the opposition were mired
39 W1an-li
sliu-ch'ao,Shen Ssu-hsiao's memorial, 58/470-472. Wen Ping, ch. 2, pp.
134-138, describes the clash between the Grand Secretariat and the opposition over
the Hai-Fang case.
40 Shen Shih-hsing, S'su-hsien-t'ang
chli,ch. 9, 134/193.
4 Wang Hsi-chiieh, Wang Wen-sukungch'uian-chzi,
ch. 9, 135/668.
42 Wang Chia-p'ing, ch. 7, 149/699.
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in partisan wrangling and mutual torment.43 Wang Hsi-chiieh commented on court politics in a letter to the effect that "The tendency
at court these days is that whatever accusers say must be true and
whatever defendants say must be false."44 In another letter, he described the court as crowded with "hungry hawks."45Wang, in other
words, implicitly acknowledged that the opposition had won the
popularity contest. Its aggressive presence was a reality he and his
allies had to reckon with.
The Grand Secretariat-Personnel-Censorial alliance, discussed later
in this essay, controlled the decision-making process. While the active members of the opposition were either forced out of government
or blocked from promotion,46 the opposition's strength came from
its ability to criticize. Its relentless charges stripped the Grand Secretariat-Personnel-Censorial alliance of public faith in its trustworthiness,
competence, and fairness, and in the character of its members.
The opposition did not stop at submitting official memorials, however. It also boosted public awareness through devastating pamphlets,
satire, and fiction. For example, when the examination scandal of
1588 described below intensified, an anonymous broadside entitled
"The exile's appeal for justice" appeared in Nanking, a hotbed of
active oppositionists. Rhetorically, it put the powerful suspects on
"public trial" in the southern capital. Peking banned circulation of
this pamphlet.47 Against this background, it is not hard to understand
why the Grand Secretariat-Personnel-Censorial alliance felt itself
preyed upon by hungry hawks.
Rancor

over Examinations

In this charged atmosphere, everything and anything could raise
suspicion or evoke a heated dispute, followed by attack and counterattack; character assassination became routine.48 These activities
Tung Fen, Mi-yuan chi, ch. 8, p. 4a. Wen Ping, ch. 2, p. 123.
Hsi-chueh, ch. 13, 136/55
45 Ibid., ch. 9, 135/673.
46 Chao Yung-hsien, ch. 25, 41/389. Also see Ch'ien Ch'ien-i, ch. 62, p. 1470.
47 T'an Ch'ien, ch. 75, p. 4612.
48 Wan-li shu-ch'ao,Chao Nan-hsing's memorial, 59/360. In this memorial, Huang
Hung-hsien and several other officials who were closely associated with the circle of
Shen Shih-hsing and Wang Hsi-chueh were accused of attacking Shen Ssu-hsiao,
Wu Chung-hsing and Chao Yung-hsien and forcing them out of government. This
shih-wenchi, ch. 19, 68/567-570. Huang
memorial is included in Chao's Chung-yi-kung
43

44 Wang
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resulted in ever deepening resentment. Although the Grand Secretariat could severely punish antagonists, repression strengthened,
rather than weakened, the opposition. Bold memorialists gained
tremendous reputations as courageous heroes, holding the moral high
ground while they risked their careers and lives. Their ability to influence public opinion and attract support among the educated served
as their weapon against those who flouted the norms of conduct.
Political ethics and ideals, especially at a time of growing corruption
and abuse, retained their importance in politics and public life.
Civil service examination scandals implicated the powerful, providing
the opposition with ammunition. Such scandals had occurred from
time to time throughout the second half of the Ming dynasty.49 But
never before had power and money compromised so frequently and
outrageously the process of grading and final decision-making, especially at the metropolitan and provincial levels.50 Frustration and
distrust toward the examinations ran high among candidates.
In 1588, the results of the metropolitan chui-jen
examination stirred
up rumors and public outrage in the capital because the candidate
who received the highest distinction was none other than Wang Heng
X tgf, the son of Wang Hsi-chuieh. Li Hung W %, another new chujen, was Shen Shih-hsing's son-in-law. There were several other
privileged sons whose examination success raised eyebrows. In fact,
rumor mongers in the capital had predicted the outcome prior to
the official announcement. It had been an accurate forecast. The
t
opposition wasted no time in probing the scandal. Kao Kui
Yu
from
and
two
officials
(cs. 1577)
K'ung-chien tTh+(cs.
1580),
the Ministry of Rites, took the initiative.
Kao Kui was the first to submit a memorial challenging the results
and calling for an investigation of deals involving the Chief Examiner, Huang Hung-hsien N ,", and the two grand secretaries.51
Hung-hsien's son Huang Ch'eng-hsuan (cs. 1586), on the other hand, charged the
other side with using the 1588 chu-jenexamination to smear his father. See the biographical account he wrote for his father, Ou-meng-t'angchi, ch. 10, pp. 18b- 19a.
49 See Wen Ping's account of the examination scandals under the Wan-li reign,
ch. 1, pp.70-85.
Ts'ai Shih-ting's
50 Wan-li shu-ch'ao, Wang Ssu-mei's memorial, 59/481-483;
memorial, 58/253. Also see Hsu Fu-tso, ch. 5, pp. 32a-38b.
51 Huang Hung-hsien was a Han-lin academician and the right mentor of the
Secretariat of the Heir Apparent. He was a close associate of Shen Shih-hsing and
Wang Hsi-chueh. He married his daughter to Wu P'eng's 4 11Ngrandson, his grandson to Tung Fen's F fi} great-granddaughter, and his granddaughter to Shen Shihhsing's grandson. See Huang Ch'eng-hstian, ch. 10, p. 24a. For information about
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He said he had dismissed the rumors until errors in the essays by
the implicated candidates and the disappearance of other candidates' essays caught his attention. This constituted sufficient evidence
to warrant an investigation.52 The administration responded by
demoting him three ranks.53
This response prompted Yu K'ung-chien to action. He stated in
his memorial that he had been assigned to review the essays and had
reported to the minister of Rites and the chief supervising secretary
of Rites, pointing out suspicious signs.54 When they took no action,
Kao Kui turned in his memorial. Yu went on to say, "Speaking out
frankly can establish one's reputation, but it can also bring one trouble.
Weighing reputation and risk, it is human nature to avoid the latter
as far as possible... But I cannot bear to stay away from trouble
while another person (Kao) takes the heat alone." Because of his
report, Yu said, he had been "bombarded with the Su-chou faction's
slanders and with the two grand secretaries' reproaches." The Censorate had joined in against Yu and Kao as well. "Instead of questioning
the examiners' involvement in the scandal, the censors blamed us
for ruffling a few feathers; and instead of investigating the back-door
connections of these candidates, they scolded us for being reckless."55
Enormous pressure forced the administration to resolve the crisis
by ordering eight new chu-jento retake the test, and appointing a
K . .
H
review panel chaired by Left Censor-in-chief Wu Shih-lai
Yu
to
the
was
inevitable.56
According
Wu's clash with
opposition
Wu
rendered
had
resolved
K'ung-chien, this crisis could have been
his opinions based on the quality of the candidates' essays. Instead
he sided with the two grand secretaries and the chief examiner.57
Wu P'eng and Tu Fen, see Jie Zhao, "Ties that Bind: The Craft of Political Networking in Late Ming Chiang-nan," pp. 138-144.
One of the offices in Shun52 Wan-li shu-ch'ao,Kao Kui's memorial, 59/483-486.
t'ien prefecture where the examination essays were kept had been burglarized.
About fifty essays, hand-copied in red ink by the clerks, were missing as a result.
This incident aroused the opposition's suspicion. Although the original essays, in
black ink, existed, there was no way of telling whether or not they were compromised since the red-ink ones had been stolen. Wan-li ti-ch'ao, pp. 418-419. Wen
Ping, ch. 1, p. 75.
53 Wan-li ti-ch'ao, p. 435
54 The minister of Rites was Chu Keng * Fi (1535-1609) and the supervising
secretary was Miao Ch'ao-yang, both affiliated with the senior grand secretary, who
chose to ignore Yu K'ung-chien's report. Yu Shen-hsing's account, ch. 8, pp. 9394, supports Yu K'ung-chien's assertion.
55 Wan-li ti-ch'ao, pp. 435-437.
56 Shen Te-fu, Wan-liyeh-huopien, p. 1291.
57 Yi K'ung-chien, ruChing-suhsien-shengshan-chiukao, ch. 1, pp. 3a-3b. Yu Shen-
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Wu's decision to pass all the essays led to a third memorial, this
time byJao Shen PAfF3 (cs. 1583). Jao charged that chief examiner
Huang Hung-hsien had placed Wang Heng first to please Wang's
father and had passed Li Hung to please his father-in-law, despite
inevitable public outrage. "People were so angry that they wanted
to spit in Huang Hung-hsien's face and beat him on the back." As
for Wu's evaluation, "I learned that some of the candidates were
incapable of composing decent essays. Wu Shih-lai, chief of the
Censorate, simply accepted all of the essays as fine. Kao Kui argued
with him, but he shamelessly insisted upon his judgement. This scandal
began as a poorly conceived theft and ended up as a blatant robbery;
it began with one person cheating, and ended up with the whole faction
cheating."58Jao's rebuke cost him terribly. On behalf of the emperor,
the administration threw him in prison, where he was subjected to
interrogation and torture and nearly beaten to death. He was later
deprived of his official status.59
Huang Hung-hsien submitted nine memorials to the administration
vehemently denying all the charges. To Kao's charge, he responded
that past examination scandals were exposed by actual evidence. If
evidence was insufficient, there were at least plenty of suspicious traces
to substantiate the allegations. Never until now had accusations been
based on blind prejudice and a few words picked up from the essays.
Huang then insisted, "Since (Kao) Kui alleges bribery, he should
present the facts as to who offered the bribes, who received them,
who passed the money to whom, and who witnessed when and where
the pay-off took place. Confronted with actual evidence, I and other
examiners can come forward to testify."
As for the prominent backgrounds of the candidates, Huang argued
that all the names were concealed and the examiners read not the
original essays, but the ones hand-copied by the official clerks. "Were
Kao Kui the chief examiner, could he possibly tell which essays were
written by a person of humble origin and who therefore should be
passed, and which essays were written by a person of official backhsing did not affiliate himself with either side. As a member of the review panel, his
observations shed a critical light on Wu Shih-lai's attempt to pass all the essays in
order to please the two grand secretaries. Yii Shen-hsing, ch. 8, pp. 93-95. Wan-li
shu-ch'ao,Wang Chi-kuang's memorial, 58/354; Shih Meng-lin's memorial, 59/488489. Wen Ping, ch. 1, p. 77.
58 TWlAan-li
shu-ch'ao,Jao Shen's memorial, 59/487-488.
59 Wan-li ti-ch'ao,p. 438. W/Van-li
sliu-ch'ao,Ts'ai Shih-ting's memorial, 58/253. Also
see T'an Ch'ien, ch. 75, p. 4597.
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ground and who therefore should be excluded? Besides, the officer
in charge of keeping the examination essays distributed them to the
examiners, and then a group of examiners read and graded all the
essays... With such procedures, I dared not and could not engage
in any illegal deals."
As far as the essay errors were concerned, Huang said that opinions differed on literary style and taste. "What (Kao) Kui approves
does not necessarily deserve approval, and what he disapproves does
not necessarily deserve disapproval. It is impossible for me or any
other examiners to tailor our opinions to Kui's. Furthermore, it is
easy to find flaws, but difficult to compose essays. Kui should have
remembered his own experience in the provincial examination. Is it
reasonable to demand perfect essays? Is it fair to make a bribery charge
based on a few flaws?"
In conclusion, Huang defended his integrity. "I come from a family
that has served the government for a few generations with a clean
conscience. I am not a beggar. Who in the world would be so insane
as to take such a risk in order to ingratiate himself with the grand
secretaries, who don't abuse power, and to take a few stinking coppers
from fellow provincials?"60
In another memorial Huang responded toJao Shen's charge. "(Jao)
Shen laid out three charges against me. First, Wang Heng, son of
the Grand Secretary, should not be placed first. Given that the candidates' names are concealed and the essays handed to us are handcopied by the clerks, it is the quality of the essays that counts. Wang
Heng's remarkable intelligence has been nationally recognized ever
since he was a child. Even Kao Kui acknowledges his talent." It was
a unanimous consensus among fourteen examiners as to which were
the best essays. "When we opened the seal, we saw the name of Wang
Heng. Is it right for me to disregard his essays for the sake of keeping
a distance from power? His essays are now widely circulated with
high praise. Is Jao) Shen the only man who doesn't know about it?
On reexamination, Wang Heng took the brush and finished the essays,
thousands of words, right away." As to the second and third charges
involving Li Hung and several other implicated candidates, Huang
maintained that his colleagues passed their essays; and he respected
their decisions.61
The administration's harsh punishment of Kao Kui andJao Shen
invited even louder protests from the opposition. The opposition was
60
61

Huang Hung-hsien, Pi-shanhsiieh-shih
chi, ch. 8, 30/248-250.
Ibid., ch. 8, 30/252
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convinced that Huang Hung-hsien had abused his power as the chief
examiner to make a big profit. One memorial claimed that the 1588
metropolitan chui-jen
examination had been turned into a market where
the price tag for the chui-jen
degree was 5,000 taels of silver.62Another
that
decision
to place Wang Heng first was calsuggested
Huang's
culated to seek Wang Hsi-chtieh's support for Huang's appointment
as a grand secretary. And he counted on Wang's protection if the
scandal was exposed.63
Above all, this dispute inflicted deep personal wounds on both sides.
The opposition's probing came at the price of demotion and dismissal.
Huang Hung-hsien paid even more dearly. He took sick leave and
never returned to government service; his ambition to join the Grand
Secretariat withered. The examination scandal cast a shadow over
his reputation for the rest of his life.64Wang Heng postponed taking
the metropolitan examination until after his father had left office.
Wang Hsi-chuieh, infuriated by the allegation against his son, became
more confrontational against the opposition.65
Weighing the dispute carefully, it is probably fair to say that the
men in the opposition had a tendency to parade their righteousness
and were all too eager to expose corrupt senior officials. Their questioning of Wang Heng's placement did not advance their position and
only gave Huang Hung-hsien an opening to repudiate their charge
and ignite Wang Hsi-chtieh's temper. On the other hand, Huang's
emphasis on the examination procedures did not allay suspicion. If
these procedures had indeed been inviolable, as Huang claimed,
examination scandals should never have arisen. In fact, it cannot be
doubted that the examination system was corrupt; power and money
compromised the process of grading and decision making.66 As one
memorialist pointed out, even Huang's colleagues in the Han-lin
Academy frowned at the result of the examination, which, in their
view, did not smell right.67

62
63

Wan-lishu-ch'ao,Wan Tsu-yue's memorial, 58/363.
Ibid., Shih Meng-lin's memorial, 59/489. Also see Yu K'ung-chien, ch. 1, p.

4a.
64 WU Yuian-ts'ui,ch. 8, p. 360.
65 Wan-lishu-ch'ao,
Li Wan's memorial, 59/30.

Mingshih,biographyof Wang Hsichueh, ch. 218, p. 5751.
66 Hsi! Fu-tso, ch. 5, pp. 38a-b, describes the cheating techniques employed by
corrupt examiners and by the clerks who hand-copied the examination essays.
67 Wan-lishu-ch'ao,
Wan Tsu-yuie'smemorial, 58/363.

This content downloaded from 130.111.46.40 on Fri, 3 May 2013 15:37:28 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

130

JIE

The Kuo-pen

ZHIAO

Controversy

Not surprisingly, the opposition's call for reforms fell on deaf ears.
As the decade 1583-1593 came to an end, Chao Yung-hsien L
! (1535-1596), a prominent opposition figure, expressed pessimism
about the future. He saw major crises looming, problems requiring
administrative and judicial improvements, financial and tax reforms,
and frontier defense strengthening, among many other concerns.68
Through all of this, the famous Kuo-penstalemate continued to poison
the political atmosphere.69 As is known, the year 1586 set the stage
for the controversy. It was triggered by the emperor's promotion of
Lady Cheng to the rank of imperial consort shortly after she bore
him a son.70 The emperor's elder son, whose mother was originally
a humble palace maid, was already five years of age, but he had
received no loving attention from his father. A neglected child, his
vulnerability was increased as Consort Cheng aspired to make her
own son heir apparent.7' He was innocently unaware that a contest
between him and his newly born half-brother had begun. The battle
pitted the Wan-li emperor and Consort Cheng against the opposition. The latter insisted that the emperor should name the elder son
heir apparent, as required by the "Ancestral Precepts" of the Ming
(Huang-Mingtsu-hsiin* H)Jtff -)If)
established by the dynastic founder.
The controversy could have been avoided if the Wan-li emperor
had followed T'ai-tsu's rules. According to the rules, as the opposition pointed out, naming an heir apparent in a judicious and decisive
manner assured a smooth succession. If the empress failed to produce
a male child, the vacancy should be filled on the basis of seniority.72
The emperor was expected to make his decision at the earliest possible time. In most previous cases the heir apparent had been chosen
at age five or six and had immediately begun his formal education
under Han-lin academicians.73
The Wan-li emperor insisted that the precepts preferred the empress's son as heir apparent. Therefore, he wished to wait a few years
to see whether his youthful empress would produce a boy.74He totally
68

Chao Yung-hsien, ch. 29, 41/460.
Shen Te-fu, p. 27 1.
70 T'an Ch'ien, ch. 73, p. 4527.
71 Mingshih,biography of Shen Shih-hsing, ch. 218, p. 5749.
72 Wan-lishu-ch'ao,
Shih Meng-lin's memorial, 58/225.
73 Ibid., 58/227. Ray Huang, 1587, A rearofNo Significance,
p. 43.
74 Wan-liti-ch'ao,p. 742.
69
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ignored the fact that his own father, the Lung-ch'ing gX
emperor
(r. 1567-1572), had named him heir apparent while the empress was
still young and his own mother was a consort. The Wan-li emperor
had little affection for his empress; he simply used her as a pretext to
postpone the decision. Behind this delay lay a palace conspiracy
allegedly masterminded by Consort Cheng to elevate herself one day
to the rank of empress, legitimizing her son as heir apparent.75 After
years of strong pressure from his officials, the emperor in 1591
reluctantly agreed to name his successor in two years.76
But the Wan-li emperor had established a pattern of making and
then breaking promises. To ensure that he would not waver this time,
the opposition submitted two requests: the eldest imperial son should
begin his formal education at once, and the Ministry of Rites should
start preparations for his investiture. The emperor reacted with rage.
Meng Yang-hao i>, the Left Supervising Secretary of Revenue, in turn responded in a memorial that "Education and the
announcement of heir apparent are not two separate issues. Since
the naming is scheduled, why is it forbidden to educate the eldest
imperial son now? If his education is blocked today, how could it be
otherwise when the time for naming arrives?"77For these remarks,
Meng was flogged and cashiered.78
While protests, floggings, and dismissals continued, Shen Shih-hsing
wavered. He occasionally expressed his concerns to the emperor on
behalf of the administration, but he distanced himself from the dispute itself. The emperor's behavior eventually prompted two grand
secretaries, Hsu Kuo nF I (1527-1596) and Wang Chia-p'ing E

J)r (1537-1604),to submita memorialon behalf of the Grand
It upset him.
Secretariaturginghim to honor his latestpromise.79
Shen Shih-hsing,on sick leave at the time, told the emperorin a
secretmemorandum
thatthisstephadbeentakenwithouthisknowledge."Itis YourMajestywho shallchoosethe heirapparent.Don't
let this talk confuse you."80The memorandum became public, reveal-

ing the cunningcharacterof the man. The oppositionaccusedhim
correctprinciples
of sellingout his two colleaguesandcompromising
751Hsia Hsieh, ch. 68, pp. 2671-2672.
76 Wan-li ti-ch'ao, p. 584.
77 Ibid., p.

630.
632. T'an Ch'ien, ch. 76, p. 4665.
79Tan Ch'ien, ch. 75, p. 4657.

78 Ibid., p.
80

W'an-liti-ch'ao, p. 587.
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to ingratiate himself with the emperor.8' Embarrassed, Shen was
forced to resign that same year.82
The year 1593 saw Wang Hsi-chtieh, the emperor's choice as senior grand secretary, take charge of the administration.83He assumed
the office during a nervous waiting period for the emperor's delivery
on his promise. The Ministry of Rites asked the emperor for instructions concerning the ceremonies for the announcement of the heir
apparent, but received none.84
The positions of the emperor and of the opposition were irreconcilable. Wang Hsi-chueh could not resolve the deadlock. To support
the opposition, even though it was institutionally the right thing, was
a recipe for losing imperial patronage and putting his career on the
line. Besides, it was the emperor who had made him the top man,
whereas the political wounds inflicted on him by the opposition were
still smarting. At any rate, his first priority was to look after his own
interests. Anticipating a bumpy road ahead, he carefully crafted his
advice to the emperor so that the latter understood his meaning, while
its ambiguity and evasiveness left no clear evidence for his opponents
to use against him.
Wang Hsi-chueh and the emperor exchanged confidential memorandums that set the stage for an imperial announcement. Wang's
memorandum stressed that the choice of heir apparent rested with
no one but His Majesty; a slip of paper from His Majesty would settle
81 It was customary in the Grand Secretariat that the grand secretaries bowed to
the authority of the senior grand secretary. See Wan-li shu-ch'ao,Ch'ien I-pen's memorial, 58/243. Chao I, Er-shih-ershih cha-chi,ch. 33, p. 483. There were few occasions when grand secretaries found some channels to vent their views, as is seen in
the memorial submitted by Hsu Kuo and Wang Chia-p'ing in the absence of Shen
Shih-hsing. The Wan-li emperor usually kept the secret memorandums in the palace, but he deliberately returned Shen's to the Grand Secretariat to humiliate Hsu
and Wang. The memorandum was a slap in their faces. The two grand secretaries,
instead of keeping the memorandum in their office, sent it to Lo Ta-hung, the supervising secretary of the Ministry of Rites, who was bound to release it to the public,
thereby putting Shen Shih-hsing on the spot. In an attempt to minimize the damage,
Shen sent a clerk to Lo's office to "borrow" the memorandum, but he refused to
return it when Lo came to pick it up the next day. This prompted an angry memorial from Lo. See Lo's Tzuyiian wen-chi, 139/509. His memorial is also included in
Wan-li shu-ch'ao,59/33-35. Lo was demoted to county clerk in a remote region as a
result. Wan-li ti-ch'ao, p. 593.
82 Wan-li ti-ch'ao,p. 600. Ming shih, biography of Shen Shih-hsing, ch. 218, p. 5750.
T'an Ch'ien, ch. 75, pp. 4657-4658.
83 Yueh Yiian-sheng, Ch'ien-ch'u-tzuwen-chi, ch. 5, p. 3a.
84 YU K'ung-chien, ch. 1, p. 12a.
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the issue right away. Any difficulty that might arise from the emperor's
decision, Wang wrote, would be left to him, Wang, to deal with. For
all its ambiguity, this struck a chord with the emperor and boosted
his confidence. In his reply, the emperor, who now had three sons,
insisted that T'ai-tsu's precepts gave priority to the empress's son
and therefore decided to postpone the appointment of the heir apparent in order to wait for his empress to produce an heir. He would
instead bestow upon his three sons the title of prince, a scheme known
as San wangppingfeng--I Mtt
X
He asked Wang to draft an imperial
edict to this effect. Wang immediately complied. He wrote in an
attached memorandum that his majesty had appropriately balanced
principle with personal feeling. The edict was sent to the Ministry of
Rites with a directive that the ministry should arrange the necessary
ceremony.85

Even though the emperor emphasized that his decision was consistent with T'ai-tsu's precepts, his critics found serious flaws in his
interpretation. Guessing that what was really on his mind was the
installation of the son of Consort Cheng, they argued that only when
an emperor had no male children and the heir apparent was selected
from a cadet family, was there a strict provision that the candidate's
mother must be the prince's principal wife. Otherwise, the precepts
dictated that if the empress did not have a son, the heir apparent
must be decided on the basis of seniority.86 The Wan-li emperor had
taken this provision out of context and twisted it to his needs.
Anticipating strong objections from his officials, the Wan-li emperor
skipped any court discussion and proceeded to announce his decision.
It was even more troubling to many officials that Wang Hsi-chuieh,
the only person consulted by the emperor, assisted him in sidestepping
the succession rules.87 The opposition demanded a reversal. Some
kept vivid accounts of their intensive lobbying, their protest via
memorials, and their confrontation with Wang Hsi-chueh in his office: these accounts offer an extraordinary glimpse of the strained
relationship between the emperor and his officials.
Thus, when nine junior officials marched to Wang Hsi-chtieh's
85 Yueh Yuian-sheng,ch. 5, pp. 3a-4a. Wan-liti-ch'ao,
pp. 751-755. Also see Ming
shih,biographyof Wang Hsi-chuieh,ch. 218, p. 5752. T'an Ch'ien, ch. 76, p. 4692.
86 Yueh Yuan-sheng, ch. 1, p. 6a. Also see Wan-lishu-ch'ao,Shih Meng-lin's
memorial,58/225-226; Chang Cheng-kuan'smemorial,58/223-224; and Ku Hsiench'eng's memorial, 58/239-241.
87 Yueh Yuian-sheng,ch. 1, pp. 20a-20b. Wan-lishu-ch'ao,
Chang Na-pi's memorial, 58/228-229.
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office,88 Yueh Yuian-sheng -2- E E recalled that Wang was angry
and raised his voice several times over the course of their conversation. Yueh raised his voice as well and said to Wang: "There is no
alternative but that we officials pressure you, Sir, to tell the emperor
to retract his decision." Wang responded: "Then I must report your
names," to which Yueh answered: "Put my name first. The interest
of the state is at stake. It is worth flogging, exile, demotion or dismissal,
so long as the decision is overturned."89
In the end Wang Hsi-chiieh yielded to the pressure and submitted
a memorial apologizing for his misunderstanding of the succession
rules, and asking the emperor to retract his decision.90 The emperor
replied to his senior grand secretary, "You have admitted the mistakes,
leaving me nowhere to turn to. I will cancel the decision. However,
I shall not name an heir apparent for two or three years, during which
time the empress may bear me a son. If she doesn't, only then will I
appoint an heir apparent."9' The immediate crisis was resolved, but
it took yet another eight years before the emperor finally named the
eldest imperial son his successor.92

88 The confrontation is recorded in Ming shih, biography of Wang Hsi-chueh, ch.
218, p. 5752.
89 Yueh Yuan-sheng, ch. 5, pp. 5b-7b.
90Ibid., ch. 5, p. 8a. Wan-li ti-ch'ao, pp. 761-762.
91 Yiieh Yuian-sheng, ch. 5, p. 8a. Also see Ming shih, biography of Wang Hsichueh, ch. 218, p. 5752.
92 The imperial edict was issued in the 10th month of Wan-li 29 (1601). So it had
taken fifteen years to bring the issue to a closure. T'an Ch'ien, ch. 79, p. 4884. To
argue that the Wan-li emperor's wish was not without justification from the standpoint of statutory or customary law, Ray Huang maintains that "had the emperor
been governed by an independent judiciary and the throne submitted its proposal
to the court, and had his wish been candidly presented and vigorously argued by
jurists, chances are that the sovereign's case against the bureaucrats would have
been won": see 1587, A rear of No Signzicance, p. 83, also pp. 84-85. Does not this
author import modern criteria into a 16thcentury debate? We are dealing here with
a traditional world in which ethics and the established codes of behavior played an
important part in making the imperial power amenable to persuasion. In the eyes
of many officials, the imperial succession was an exceedingly important institutional
issue of which morality was an integral part. To assume a rigid distinction between
a moral argument and a legal one seems anachronistic to me. It is important to maintain
a sense of perspective about late Ming politics, keeping in mind that ethical discourse
and institutional checks were carefully interwoven into a web of restraints to check
imperial arbitrariness and irresponsibility.
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over Censorate

The Kuo-pencontroversy peaked between 1591 and 1593. To speak
of blood on the floor of the court was hardly an exaggeration. Yet,
for all the damage it caused, it was only part of the wrangling that
raged for a decade and sapped the government. The conflict between
the opposition and the Grand Secretariat boiled down to power and
control. The opposition called for reforming the administrative structure to the point where the Grand Secretariat would relinquish control
over other government branches and share its responsibility and
dec'sion-making power with them. This balanced relationship, they
thought, would increase efficiency and keep both the throne and the
Grand Secretariat in check.
The opposition's advocacy of institutional checks as well as its
uncompromising stand on principles caused Shen Shih-hsing and
Wang Hsi-chueh tremendous stress and trouble. They were constantly
under fire, challenged and embarrassed. Among the issues that kept
the Grand Secretariat and the opposition at odds, the realignment
of administrative authority was central. And at the core of the issue
was the Grand Secretariat's relationship to the Ministry of Personnel and to the censorial offices.
The Ministry of Personnel controlled selection and appointment.
The censorial-supervisory branch, which included a Chief Surveillance
Office, thirteen Provincial Surveillance Offices, and the Six Offices
of Scrutiny, ensured open avenues of criticism and exercised disciplinary power to keep the government officials, including the grand
secretaries, in check.93 The jurisdiction of the Ministry of Personnel
and of the censorial-supervisory branch inevitably created frictions
with the Grand Secretariat. Powerful grand secretaries in the past
decades had successfully reduced these agencies to a subordinate status.
That Chang Chu-cheng could treat the minister of Personnel as if
he were a humble clerk and maintain tight control over the censors
exemplified his iron-fisted style.94
But the Grand Secretariat was on the defensive after 1582. The
opposition insisted that it take its hands off the Ministry of Personnel and the censorial-supervisory branch so that they could exercise
93 Ming shih, ch. 73, pp. 1767-1769; ch. 74, pp. 1805-1807. Also see Hsieh Kuochen, Minig-Ch'ingchih-chzitang-sheytin-tungk'ao, pp. 4-5. Hucker, The CensorialSystem
of Ming China, p. 9.
94 Ting Yiian-chien, ch. 6, 171/29. Also see Shen Te-fu, p. 639.
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their duties fully. This might indeed alter existing political arrangements profoundly and lead to a further reducing of the Grand Secretariat's power. Unwilling to endorse, but unable to reject, this
institutional challenge, Shen Shih-hsing chose to finesse it. Unlike
Chang Chiu-cheng, he appeared congenial and deferential to his
colleagues; he tolerated criticisms to a considerable degree, and he
respected the decisions made by senior personnel officials and by
censors. As a matter of fact, his allies held most of the senior posts in
the central government. Networking was exceedingly useful for Shen
Shih-hsing. Multiple ties included teacher-disciple and classmate (t'ungnzen [p]*) relationships associated with the civil service examinations,
regional affiliations, friendships, and marriages. They bound him and
his associates together against the opposition, protecting their interests.95 It was through such alliances that Shen could temper the
decisions of the Ministry of Personnel and manipulate the censorialsupervisory branch.96 His deference was just a cover.97
The Grand Secretariat controlled by Shen Shih-hsing and Wang
Hsi-chuieh clearly bore a Chiang-nan iI -A, or more precisely, a Suchou V +11character.98 The differences in their personalities complemented each other nicely. The soft-tempered Shen did not like
to push his opponents too far. After he had transferred, demoted, or
dismissed people, he often recalled some of them to government service.
He was able to minimize personal animosity and enhance his own
image of congeniality and generosity.99 Wang, on the other hand,
was quick-tempered, stubborn and tough. If Shen was known for
stepping back in face of the opposition's challenges, Wang actively
engaged the attackers. The blending of their approaches gave the
Grand Secretariat a nice guy, tough guy duality. 100
Thus, the Grand Secretariat's relation to the Ministry of Personnel and the censorial-supervisorybranch remained somewhere between
Chang Chui-cheng's authoritarian grip and the hands-off advocated
by the opposition. Aggrieved and unconvinced, the opposition continued its relentless probing and pounding. As Shen was to complain
to a friend, "Administrative power has already been restored to the
Six Ministries, so that I am not able to promote a person or take an
95 For his

Chiang-nan ties, see Jie Zhao, "Ties that Bind," p. 142.
Ma Ying-t'u'smemorial, 58/332. Also see Shen Te-fu, p. 640.
Wan-lishu-ch'ao,
97 Chao Yung-hsien, ch. 4, 41/47-48.
98 YU Shen-hsing, ch. 8, p. 93. Shen and Wang were both natives of Su-chou.
99Mingshih,biography of Shen Shih-hsing, ch. 218, p. 5749.
100Wan-lishu-ch'ao,Li I-wan's memorial, 59/31.
96
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initiative on my own. But I am still accused of having too much
power. What should I do then? Should I stand by with my hands in
the sleeves and my mouth shut?"101Shen's correspondence depicts
him as trapped in a predicament wherein his concessions could never
be enough to satisfy the opposition.
Nonetheless, a large number of often very long memorials by the
opposition rebutted Shen's claim. For example, a memorial of 1585
described the "consultation requirement" (ch'ing-chiao# L) in the
following terms: "The censorial agencies are obligated to send reports to the senior grand secretary to receive his advice on the tone
of their investigations and recommendations. Likewise, Personnel and
other ministries send their reports to the senior grand secretary to
seek his opinions on appointment and other matters."102Even when
he was on sick leave, Shen Shih-hsing insisted that the ministers consult
him at his residence before making decisions. 103 They did not exercise
independent authority.
To assert the consultation privilege, Shen Shih-hsing relied upon
two sources of support: one was the Grand Secretariat-PersonnelCensorial network, of which he was the patron, and the other was
imperial patronage, successfully cultivated since 1583. Despite the
monarch's egotistic desires and hot temper, in dealing with the emperor
Shen had no difficulty finding weak points where imperial authority
could be turned to his advantage and thus a tacit agreement could
be reached. Under Shen's administration the annual budget of the
Palace Treasury had originally been about one million, but later he
had it increased by 200,000 taels of silver. In addition, the huge
expenses for the imperial birthdays and weddings, for palace renovations, and so forth, were met by the state, draining the public treasury.'04 The emperor in turn supported his senior grand secretary
against the opposition. Furthermore, he granted Shen the privilege
of sending him confidential memorandums, known as mi-chieh%J
tJ. Indeed, given his infrequent participation in state affairs his information was very much limited to such confidential memorandums
from his senior grand secretary. This made it easy for Shen to shape
the emperor's opinions. As Ch'ien I-pen X -t
, an active member
101 Shen

Shih-hsing, ch. 36, 134/752.
Wan-lishu-ch'ao,Ma Ying-t'u's memorial, 58/333.
103 Wan-liti-ch'ao,p. 540.
104 Wan-lishu-ch'ao,
Ch'ien I-pen's memorial, 58/246; Feng Ying-feng's memorial, 59/272. The Ministryof Revenue submittedseveralmemorialsin 1588 reporting the fiscal deficit and urging the emperor to restrainhimselfwith regardto lavish
spending, but to no avail. See Wan-liti-ch'ao,pp. 409-410, 411-413.
102
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of the opposition, pointed out in a memorial of 1591, the emperor
entrusted Shen with the power to draft and issue imperial edicts on
his behalf. Nine out of every ten decisions, all bearing the imperial
imprint, were in fact made by the senior grand secretary.'05
To illustrate Shen Shih-hsing's hold on other government branches, Ch'ien I-pen chose the minister of Rites as an example. The
latter was not affiliated with the inner circle of the senior grand
secretary. Nevertheless, in selecting the chief examiners for the provincial examinations, he discussed the selection with the senior grand
secretary, not once but twice. Ch'ien commented: "For this decision
alone, he had to consult the senior grand secretary twice to make
sure he did not miss his hints." In short, even an unaffiliated man
could not resist the pressure, to say nothing of ministers who willingly
humbled themselves to the senior grand secretary.106
The Grand Secretariat's relation to the Ministry of Personnel was
the key to its ability to exert authority over the six ministries. It was
mutually beneficial to the senior grand secretary and the minister of
Personnel to maintain a cozy collaboration. An opposition member
put it bluntly: "Take a look at senior grand secretaries. Which of
them hasn't pursued his selfish interests by manipulating Personnel?
Take a look at the ministers of Personnel. Which of them hasn't visited
the senior grand secretary's office and private residence to please
him? The senior grand secretary takes advantage [of his influence
on the Ministry of Personnel] to take bribes, while in return he allows
the minister to serve for a long time. Above all, the senior grand
secretary and the minister of Personnel team up to engage in thievery.
What public good is served by this?"'07This critique was directed
specifically at the relationship between Shen Shih-hsing and Yang
Wei %X(1514-1605), the then minister of Personnel.108
"Thievery" caught the essence of power politics. Power and profit
fueled the Grand Secretariat-Personnel-Censorial alliance, which
distributed desirable appointments and other favors and tolerated
bribery and corruption.'09 The oversight system was bankrupt, and
105

Wan-lishu-ch'ao,Ch'ien I-pen's memorial, 58/246.
The minister of Rites was Yu Shen-hsing h:I'H(1545-1608).

106Ibid., 58/246.

See Ono Kazuko, Minki tdshak6',pp. 19 1-197.
107 Yi K'ung-chien, Yuan-hsuieh-chai
i-yiu,ch. 3, p. 62b.
108 For Yang Wei's collaboration with Shen Shih-hsing, see Chao Yung-hsien,
Ch'en T'ai-lai'smemorial, 58/365. Mingshih,biogch. 28, 41/439. Wan-lishu-ch'ao,
raphy of Sung Hsun, ch. 224, p. 5890.
109Wan Kuo-ch'in, WanEr-yiuhsien-sheng
i-chi,ch. 1, 78/10-14. In his memorial,
Wan pointed out that the high-rankinggenerals used the defense budget to bribe
Shen Shih-hsing. The memorial is also included in Wan-lishu-ch'ao,59/21-24.
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institutional checks were inoperative. It was such conditions that gave
free reign to officials like Yang Wen-chu4t i
X (cs. 1577).11o
In 1589, Chiang-nan suffered a terrible drought and famine. An
imperial edict authorized the distribution of 200,000 taels of silver
to Nan-chih-li and 100,000 taels to Che-chiang as a relief fund. This
distribution was assigned to Shen Shih-hsing's protege Yang Wenchii, the right supervising secretary of Revenue. 1 With such a huge
sum at his disposal, he seized the opportunity. The bulk of the fund
went to pay for Yang's extravagant parties with local Chiang-nan
officials and to finance the expensive gifts he received from them.
Little was left to rescue the starving from widespread famine. Many
years later, Ting Yuan-chien T j , a native of Che-chiang and
an upright scholar-official, still felt indignation as he recalled this
scandal: "Ordinary people in Chiang-nan have a fresh memory of
what Yang did to them. They hate him so much that they wish they
could tear him to pieces and eat all his flesh and bones."'"12
When Yang Wen-chu returned to the capital, it was no secret that
he had made a fortune from his assignment. But no disciplinary action
was taken against him. To the contrary, he was soon promoted to
be chief supervising secretary of Personnel. "I3In other words, a man
who should have been brought to justice now held a powerful position in the censorial-supervisory system.
In a memorial of 1591, T'ang Hsien-tsu
, a secretary of
Rites at Nanking, brought up Yang's corruption, saying: "The three
grand secretaries (i.e., Shen Shih-hsing, Wang Hsi-chuieh, and Hsu
Kuo) are natives of Su-chou and Hui-chou jt )I'I.(Yang) Wen-chui's
avarice is well known in these two prefectures. How is it possible
that these grand secretaries have not learned about it? It is indeed
unbelievable that Yang now ranks high in the Six Offices of Scru"
tiny! I4 For these remarks T'ang was demoted to county clerk in a
remote region. 115
I "0Chao Yung-hsien, ch.

4, 41/47. Wan-lishu-ch'ao,Chang Ying-yang'smemorial, 59/124-126; Yang Ting-lan's memorial, 59/128.
111Wan-liti-ch'ao,p. 465. Also see Shen Te-fu, p. 644.
112 Ting Yuan-chien, ch. 1, 170/659.
113 Shen Te-fu, p. 1317. The chief supervisingsecretary of Personnel held the
most powerful position in the Six Offices of Scrutiny. Yang was promoted to that
position in 1590. See Wan-liti-ch'ao,p. 523.
114 Wan-lishu-ch'ao,
T'ang Hsien-tsu'smemorial, 58/260-263.
115 Wan-liti-ch'ao,
p. 552. Also see T'an Ch'ien, ch. 75, p. 4649. The dismissalof
T'ang Hsien-tsu only prompted more criticalmemorials.In the end, a memorial by
Chang Shou-ch'engbroughtdown Yang, who was cashieredin late 1591. His patron
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The reading public in the two capitals captured glimpses of the
spectacle through unofficial essays, plays, stories, and satires. The
anonymous writers of these works seemingly either had access to high
circles or were themselves insiders. One satire, circulating in the
capital at this time, depicted a distinctive feature of Peking politics,
namely, how the chief servants of the powerful officials handled backdoor deals. The satire, entitled "The Biography of Five, Seven and
Nine," identified Chang Chiu-cheng's servant Yu Ch'i r -L, Shen
Shih-hsing's servant Shen Chiu F@tL, and Wang Hsi-chiieh's servant Wang Wu E E as big bribe-takers and influential behind-thescene brokers."6 T'ang Hsien-tsu's memorial did point out that Shen
Chiu had played a decisive role in securing the position of chief
supervising secretary of Personnel for Yang Wen-chti."7
When he joined the Grand Secretariat, Wang Hsi-chuieh had made
a solemn oath to eschew cheating, favoritism, and bribery, to the
applause of his colleagues. One Chiang-nan friend praised him as
incorruptible.I"" But his own financial history told a different story.
A student with little wealth to start with, Wang not only achieved
great success in his career, but also great affluence. He was one of
the richest men in his native Su-chou. His servant Wang Wu, a
character in the satire, accumulated a large fortune as well."''
The Yang Wen-chui scandal was just the tip of the iceberg. It was
a practice for Shen Shih-hsing, a protective patron, to appoint his
men to desirable and lucrative assignments and shelter the corrupt
from prosecution. His proteges in turn manned the front line, attacking
his opponents and protecting his interests.120As Ch'ien Ch'ien-i X
Shen Shih-hsinghad stepped down by then. See Wan-lishu-ch'ao,
58/670-671. Wan1iti-ch'ao,p. 575.
116Shen Te-fu, p. 628. Shen Te-fu suspectedYu Shen-hsing to be the author of
this satire. According to him, Shen Shih-hsingblocked Yu from joining the Grand
Secretariat.He wrote his satire, therefore,to expose the dirt and ridiculein the way
politics were played out behind the scenes in the hands of a few servants.The focus
of the satire was Shen Shih-hsing'schief servant Shen Chiu (sometimes also called
by his birth name, Sung Chiu). In his memorial, Li I-wan described Shen Chiu's
role in taking bribes and his connections with eunuchs:see Wan-lishu-ch'ao,
59/28.
117 Wan-lishu-ch'ao,
T'ang Hsien-tsu's memorial, 58/262.
'18Shen Te-fu, p. 620.
119WuYuan-ts'ui, ch'i-chi,ch. 2, p. 467. T'an Ch'ien, ch. 81, p. 5028.
120Shen Shih-hsing'smost aggressivehenchmen were called the "three sheep (a
pun on the surname Yang) and eight dogs." Yang Wen-chutwas one of the three
sheep. Yu Shen-hsing,ch. 12, p. 128. Shen Te-fu, p. 2321. Also see Wan-lishu-ch'ao,
Chang Na-pi's memorial, 58/371; Chang Shou-ch'eng'smemorial, 58/670-671; Li
T'ien-lin's memorial, 58/672-674.
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=-"t
t (1582-1664)was to say, ''OfElcials
workingfor Chiang-lingaI
0 (i.e.,ChangChu-cheng)werecompetenthorses,whereasofficials
affiliatedwith the grandsecretariesafterChangwere shrewdfoxes
andcunningrats.''12l
ThislateMingobservationdepicts"foxes"and
"rats"destroyingthe institutionalandethicalfoundationof the state.
When a modernscholarcontrastsShen Shih-hsing'ssincerityand
humilitywith ChangChu-cheng'sarrogance,assertingthat Chang
"tendedto overlookthe largerissuesandin the end evolvedinto the
kind of man Menciushad describedas capableof seeingthe barbs
of a featherbut unableto visualizea cartloadof faggots,''122
we can
only disagree.It is important,in this regard,to be remindedof Hai
Jui's assessmentat the time: Chang Chu-chenghad a greattalent
for managingstate afEairs,
but was not good at protectinghis own
interests()! E I 5 =n=
g , tS 9 = X). 123The reversecouldactually
be said of Shen Shih-hsing.
Institutional Erosion
Shen Shih-hsinginheritedfrom ChangChu-chengefficientmanagementof stateafEairs,
well-guarded
frontiers,soundfiscalpolicies,
andoverflowing
treasuries.
124By 1591,afternineyearsas SeniorC;rand
Secretary,he leftbehinda governmentcrippledby partisanpolitics,
maladministration,
corruption,deficits,frontierdefensefailures,and,
more dreadfully,by the breakdownof the proceduralcheckson
imperialirresponsibility
and arbitrariness.125
In a letterto LeftCensor-in-chiefLiShih-tat2(1531-1599),
Chao Yung-hsienblamedShen's administration
for this appalling
disintegration
and calledLi'sattentionto the problemsthatafilicted
the Censorate.Thatinstitution,
in Chao'sopinion,hadovertherecent
decadebeenreducedto the GrandSecretariat's
partisantool,blocking
the oppositionfromreprimanding
the administration
forits misconduct."TheCensorateis obligedto investigate
andimpeachwrongdoing
so as to keepofficialsunderdiscipline,"he recalled;but, contraryto
theirduty,the censorsonlywentafteroutspokenofficials."Ifsomeone
l2lCh'ienCh'ien-i,ch. 30, p. 895
122 Ray Huang,1587,A Learof J\loSignficance,
ch. 2., p. 61, and also see p. 53,
p. 59.
123 TranCh'ien,ch. 71, p. 4415.
124 Hsia Hsieh,ch. 67, p. 2638. Also see Hucker,"TheTung-linMovementof
the Late Ming period,"p. 132.
l25WangChia-p'ing,ch. 8, 149/714. Tan Ch'ien,ch. 72, p. 4441
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criticizes a powerful official and touches a nerve, that person is
immediately attacked by a gang of censors. Isn't it preposterous when
the chief of the Censorate fails to discipline these censors? Worse
than that, he himselfjumps in and backs up the attackers, claiming
that he does so in order to protect the dignity of senior officials."'26
Turning to the sanctions, Chao stated that the Ming Statutespermitted
all officials to speak honestly and frankly. Wang Chen i J&and Liu
Chin Wjf, for all their abuse and brutality, dared not openly forbid
officials from speaking out. 127It was unprecedented for this administration to create sanctions in order to prohibit junior officials from
expressing their views.
Furthermore, the administration also withheld critical memorials
from being filed in the official gazetteers. Chao argued, "From ancient
times, critical views about state and society, even though not accepted
on the moment, have been documented in the official records for
the purpose of informing the later generations of the wisdom and
intelligent opinions in the past." Now the administration disregarded
this tradition and issued the ban out of fear of the exposure of its
wrongdoing.
The Grand Secretariat-Personnel-Censorial alliance, as Chao saw
it, provided a sanctuary for corruption, a disease that weakened
institutional practices and political ethics more rapidly than ever before.
Corruption in the Censorate was not just the failure of one office or
an isolated case, such as a failure of the Grand Secretariat. Charged
as it was with the enormous responsibility of searching out illegal
activities in officialdom, the Censorate itself committed corruption
and bribery. These were offices that used their power to engage in
all sorts of unethical transactions, with the connivance of powerful
patrons.
Taking censorial inspection as example, Chao said the following:
There is a strict and orderly procedure for scheduling provincial inspection
assignments. When Chiang-ling (i.e. Chang Chu-cheng) was in power, the
procedure was observed. But lobbying for assignment is common nowadays.
The intimate and deceitful are sent to near and profitable provinces, while
the honest and unconnected are assigned to the far and difficult... Isn't it

126 Chao Yung-hsien alluded to Wu Shih-lai, the former Left Censor-in-chief
under Shen's administration.
127Wang Chen in the 1440s and Liu Chin in the early 1550s were powerful eunuchs
who terrorized the officialdom through the Eastern and Western Depots, the imperial secret services. Mingshih,ch. 304, section on Wang Chen, pp. 7772-7774, and
section on Liu Chin, pp. 7786-7792.
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absurd that the Censorate, the office in charge of oversight, takes the lead in
breaking the rules? As for investigations, the central government relies upon
its inspectors as ears and eyes to report the performance of local officials.
Inspectors today frequently receive secret instructions [from their patrons]
before their trip as to which matters they should investigate. If local officials
do not bend, they manufacture evidence against them and block their promotions... As a result, men of integrity and ability are put down; those on
the fast track are all affiliated with the powerful."

Corruption was running rampant within the Censorate. "In the
past, censors on inspection were forbidden to bring back any item
after their tours of duty. Even twenty or thirty years ago there was
no such a thing as a censor on inspection bribing powerful officials
in Peking to the tune of several hundred taels of silver. But it is not
unusual now.... So the bookcases in their return boats are filled with
gold and jewelry... Above all, it is now customary to pass gifts as
gratitude for recommendations, awards, upcoming appointments,
evaluations, etc. Prefects and magistrates are running around day
and night looking for ways to meet these demands. How can they be
expected to observe ethical principles and not abuse the common
people to line their pockets?"128
Chao Yung-hsien's letter raised serious concerns about the deteriorating health of the dynasty. He feared that the government
would be heading for disaster if no serious measures were taken to
repair the corrupt censorial-supervisory system. The Grand Secretariat, in this view, was the problem, not the solution. The opposition
now became more convinced than ever that the answer lay in initiatives by the six ministries to reform the dysfunctional institutions.
To that end, the Grand Secretariat must relinquish control over them.
Surely the opposition saw it as an encouraging sign when the Secretariat-Personnel-Censorial alliance in effect collapsed: in 1590 and 1591
its three key members, Minister of Personnel Yang Wei, Left Censorin-chiefWu Shih-lai, and Shen Shih-hsing himself, all had to resign.129
Shen Shih-hsing had seen the Ministry of Personnel drifting away
after the resignation of Yang Wei. Before he left office, he searched
for a cooperative minister of Personnel and gambled on Lu Kuangtsu FW $l (1521-1597). Lu's disagreement with the opposition on
a few occasions, his political skills, and his solid reputation in officialdom made him seem the right man for the job. Shen badly needed
a competent ally to assist him in reinvigorating his shattered admi128 Chao Yung-hsien, Chao's letter, ch. 28, 41/438-440.
129Yang and Wu resigned in 1590; Shen stepped down in 1591. T'an Ch'ien, ch.
75, p. 4623, p. 4627.
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nistration and pacifying the opposition.'30 With his strong support,
Lu was appointed Minister of Personnel in 1591.
But Lu Kuang-tsu proved to be a huge disappointment to Shen
Shih-hsing. The new minister was interested in restoring the dignity
and authority of his office, paying little heed to the "consultation
privilege" that the Senior Grand Secretary had enjoyed for years.
What troubled the Senior Grand Secretary even more were Lu's
personnel initiatives: Shen's opponents, ousted years ago, were now
recalled, and a number of officials affiliated with his faction were
either transferred or demoted. With such independent actions by Lu,
the institutional challenge now returned to the spotlight and Shen
could only express his regret. As he told Wang Hsi-chuieh, "I was
fooled by this bald old man!"'131
Lu Kuang-tsu presided over the 1592 triennial "great reckoning,"
that is, the evaluation of all the officials outside the capital. Aided by
Left Censor-in-chief Li Shih-ta, he promoted twenty-two officials who
had a strong record of competence and moral character, and demoted
or dismissed several officials infamous for corruption, most of whom
were affiliated with the faction of the Grand Secretariat.'32 For the
first time in the decade, the Minister of Personnel and Left Censorin-chief worked together to reform their offices and oversee this
important occasion without any scandals.
These two senior officials were not affiliated with the opposition.
Yet, their exercise of authority propelled them into the thick of parti-san fighting: they provoked the Grand Secretariat by their
"defection" and received warm applause from the opposition. Keenly
aware of the circumstances, Lu forced himself not to let personal
likes and dislikes blind his judgement and temper his decisions.'33
130 Ting

Yuian-chien, ch. 6, 171/30.
ch. 6, 171/31. Wang Hsi-chueh expressed his negative view of Lu Kuangtsu in a letter to Ku Hsien-ch'eng: Wang Hsi-chueh, ch. 18, 136/171-172. This letter is also included in Ku's Ching-kaots'ang-kao,ch. 3, 1292/29-30.
132 Ting Yuian-chien, ch. 6, 171/31. As a crucial part of the appointment and
evaluation system of the Ming, all the officials outside the capital were subject to
evaluation every three years, known as the triennial "great reckoning," or ta-chi 7k
=t. All the officials in the capital below fourth rank were subjected to a similar evaluation every six years, known as the sexennial capital evaluation, or ching-ch'a f W.
The Ministry of Personnel and the Censorate conducted these evaluations. See TaMing hui-tien, ch. 209, p. 482. Shen Te-fu, p. 800, p. 2240. Also see Pierre-Etienne
Will, "Creation, conflict, and routinization: appointing officials by drawing lots, 15941700," p. 5.
133 Ting Yuian-chien, ch. 6, 171/31. Also see Ming shih, biography of Lu Kuangtsu, ch. 224, p. 5893.
131 Ibid.,
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And yet, despite his effort to carry out the 1592 great reckoning fairly
and judiciously, and precisely because he stood firmly on principle,
he caused much agitation in the Grand Secretariat. He was soon
pushed out of office.'34
Although it got rid of Lu Kuang-tsu, the Grand Secretariat failed
to resolve the frictions with the Ministry of Personnel. The next
minister, Sun Lung J* j (1525-1594), was even tougher to deal with.
Sun presided over the 1593 sexennial evaluation of capital officials
with the aide of Chao Nan-hsing
the director
(M (1550-1628),
of the Bureau of Appointments. The stakes on both sides were very
high, since the capital evaluations "could result in drastic changes of
personnel at the higher echelons and mark the onset of new policies."'135
The 1593 capital evaluations proceeded strictly under the direction of the Minister of Personnel, independent of the Grand Secretariat's influence. To ensure the integrity of the evaluations, Sun
Lung and Chao Nan-hsing applied the strict rules to themselves first,
by demoting their own relatives. After this, no one dared to tamper
with the process. 136Their report went directly to the emperor, without
any consultation of the Grand Secretariat; and it came as no surprise that among the dismissed and demoted were favorites of the
grand secretaries.137
The 1593 capital evaluation challenged the decades-old practice
following which the Grand Secretariat, not the Ministry of Personnel, always called the shots on important personnel decisions. 138 Wang
Hsi-chuieh, who was now Senior Grand Secretary, felt threatened as
Sun Lung and Chao Nan-hsing could now rally the six ministries to
free themselves from the Grand Secretariat's influence, a cause which
the opposition had long advocated. To eliminate this threat, he turned
to the emperor for support. An imperial edict was issued, reproaching
Sun Lung for arbitrary use of authority and dismissing Chao Nanhsing. The edict prompted Sun Lung to submit his resignation.'39

134 Lu's tenure lasted less than a year. Ming shih, biography of Lu Kuang-tsu,
ch. 224, pp. 5892-5893. T'an Ch'ien, ch. 76, p. 4669.
135Will, "Creation, conflict, and routinization,"p. 5.
136 Wan-lishu-ch'ao,
Ch'en T'ai-lai's memorial, 58/365.
137Ibid., 58/364; Chia Yen's memorial, 58/367. Also see Mingshih,biographyof
Sun Lung, ch. 224, pp. 5894-5895.
138 WU Ytian-ts'ui, ch. 1, p. 4 1.
139In the epitaph he wrote for Sun Lung, Chao Nan-hsing described the 1593
capital evaluation and the Grand Secretariat'sretaliation:Chao Nan-hsing, ch. 14,
68/401-403. Also see Wan-liti-ch'ao,pp. 729-730. Ming shih, ch. 224, p. 5895.
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Unlike Shen Shih-hsing, Wang Hsi-chuieh did not care much for
the niceties of politics; he pulled up his sleeves and went after his
opponents. Chao Yung-hsien, before being forced out of government,
had predicted that vicious attacks upon upright officials would not
stop until they were all driven out of government.'40 Playing rough,
however, only increased the tension between the Grand Secretariat,
the Ministry of Personnel, and the opposition.'4' Their continuous
strife further undermined an already fractured government, ushering
in a far more aggressive and destructive phase of factionalism. With
a battle looming, Wang Hsi-chiieh considered he had had enough;
he resigned from government in 1594.142
Conclusion
Chang Chui-cheng passed away in 1582 with no sense of foreboding.
But confidence and order, the hallmarks of his administration, evaporated quickly in the following decade. In the writings of literati
nostalgia for the past and worry for the future were blended to convey
a sense of insecurity and uncertainty.'43 Indeed, by the end of the
decade anxiety and recklessness had already permeated the official
world, and they would soon trickle down through society.
This poignant and gloomy sentiment echoed the rapid disintegration
that had been taking place in the higher spheres of Ming government
during the decade of 1583-1593. For the sake of their political survival
Shen Shih-hsing and Wang Hsi-chiieh winked at the Wan-li emperor's
tearing down of the web of restraints. This enabled them to secure
imperial support for the managerial power they exercised over other
government branches. Stained by corruption scandals, obstruction
of the ground rules, and subservience to the emperor, Shen and his
140 Chao Yung-hsien, ch. 31, 41/467. Wang Hsi-chueh's retaliation was fierce.
About sixty officials were cashiered as a result. See Wen Ping, ch. 3, p. 179. For
Wang's involvement in forcing Chao out of government, see Wan-li shu-ch'ao,Ch'en
T'ai-lai's memorial, 58/366. Wu Yuian-ts'ui, ch. 5, pp. 162-163. Wen Ping, ch. 3,
pp. 170-175. Ch'ien Ch'ien-i, ch. 62, p. 1471.
141 The dismissal of Chao Nan-hsing and Sun Lung's resignation outraged the
opposition. See Wan-li shu-ch'ao,Shih Meng-lin's memorial, 58/369-370; Chang Napi's memorial, 58/371-374; and Kao P'an-lung's memorial, 58/375-376. Wen Ping,
ch. 3, p. 161, viewed the 1593 dispute about the capital evaluation as a cause for
further escalating partisan rancor and criticized Wang Hsi-chiieh for it.
142 Wang Hsi-chuoeh resigned in the 5th month of Wan-li 22; his tenure as senior
grand secretary had lasted a year and a half. T'an Ch'ien, ch. 76, p. 4730.
143 See Timothy Brook, T7heConfusionsof Pleasure,pp. 1- 13.
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associates provided the opposition with ample ammunition to discredit
them on institutional and ethical grounds. The agitated administration in turn punished its critics by means of demotion, dismissal or
transfer. As a result, the emperor's caprices and the partisan struggles
between the Grand Secretariat and the opposition together destroyed
the balance crucial for a reasonable management of state affairs.
Upon reflecting on the fall of the Ming, Huang Tsung-hsi
X (1610-1695) stated that the origin of misrule under the Ming lay
in the abolition of the prime ministership: "After the prime ministership
was abolished, the moment an emperor was succeeded by an unworthy
son there was no worthy person at all to whom one could turn for
help. Then how could even the idea of dynastic succession be maintained?" 144 The compilers of Ming shih, for their part, held the senior
grand secretaries accountable for the disintegration. Yet for all their
culpability, we must recognize the potential perils of their situation.
The senior grand secretaries were held hostage by T'ai-tsu's institutions, which assured the ultimate power of the throne. Operating in
a system that did not allow for prime ministership, they were vulnerable
both to imperial rage and to the opposition's criticisms. Motivated
by the survival instinct, the senior grand secretaries served the emperor
humbly, with "the mind of a eunuch or palace maid."'145
The opposition, using T'ai-tsu's abolition of the prime ministership
to justify its cause, wished to devolve the managerial power of the
Grand Secretariat to the six ministries. In a situation where the emperor
was aloof from state affairs and abused his power arbitrarily, the
devolution of the Grand Secretariat's managerial power was a recipe
for destroying the already very fragile unity of the government. Given
the fact that none of the six ministries was able to replace the Grand
Secretariat by taking over its policy-making and managerial responsibilities, to nullify the Grand Secretariat was bound to lead to chaos.
With this in mind, and as the disintegration accelerated after 1593,
it was not difficult to anticipate the end result. The power struggle
between the Grand Secretariat and the Ministry of Personnel paved
the way for a savage war of factionalism. When the Wan-li reign
approached its end the Grand Secretariat had become utterly dysfunctional. Yeh Hsiang-kao , [pJE` (1559-1627), the senior grand
secretary at the time, could only lament that "the senior grand
secretary today is very much like the head of beggars, using up all
144 Huang Tsung-hsi, Waiting
for theDawn:A Planfor thePrince,transl.deBary,pp.
101-102.
145 Ibid., p. 95.
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of his energy to keep his voice as loud as possible in begging for
food. Yet his fellow beggars, still unsatisfied, yell at him for not raising
his voice even louder."146Yeh's remark is sad testimony to the struggles
which devoured not only the Grand Secretariat but also the entire
central bureaucracy. The warring factions cleared the way for the
rise of the eunuch party.
The fateful legacy of T'ai-tsu's institutions was precisely the extent
of his desire to grasp power for the throne alone, which inevitably
sapped the quality of the central bureaucracy.'47 Thus, the decade
1583-1593 was a turning point in shaping the fate of the Ming dynasty.
An unworthy emperor and his unworthy senior grand secretaries
wrangled with the opposition, the only force that cried out for containing the spread of the illness. The opposition brought down the
senior grand secretaries and discredited the Grand Secretariat, but
it could not break through the gridlock and was unable to renovate
the government. "Since partisan wrangling could only be resolved
by one clique's winning imperial favor and ousting its adversaries
from positions of influence, these struggles served merely to weaken
the officialdom's resistance to the irregularities of the emperor and
his eunuch favorites."'48 This consuming and destructive process
continued until the dynasty was brought to an end.
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